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Compelling landlords to evict drug dealers: 
Cook v City of Buena Park, 2005 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
City ordinance requiring landlord to prevail in unlawful detainer action against all 
occupants of rental unit when police chief suspects any tenant is involved in drug-related 
activity violated procedural due process. 
Cook v City of Buena Park (2005) 126 CA4th 1, 23 CR3d 700 
The City enacted a Narcotics Crime and Gang-Related Eviction Program ordinance giving the 
chief of police discretion to order a landlord to evict all tenants of a rental unit if the chief 
suspects that the premises have been used for any illegal drug activity, gang-related crime, or 
drug-related nuisance. Following the citation of a roommate of one of Cook’s tenants for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, the police chief ordered Cook to evict the tenants of the rental 
unit or be held in violation of the ordinance. Cook sued, challenging the constitutionality of the 
ordinance. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cook and permanently enjoined 
enforcement of the ordinance, ruling that it violated substantive due process and was overbroad.  
The court of appeal affirmed the result, but invalid ted the ordinance on the grounds of 
procedural due process. The court recognized that Cook had a protected property interest—i.e., 
the financial impact of the certain loss of rents under the terms of his lease with the tenant, the 
avoidance of fines imposed by the ordinance upon its violation as well as in the costs and 
expenses to be incurred in pursuing eviction proceedings. As for the ordinance, it is 
constitutionally deficient in three respects:  
• The notice provided by the police chief is insufficient to permit the landlord a reasonable 
chance of prevailing in the unlawful detainer action, thus exposing the landlord to unjustified 
litigation costs and the possibility of a tenant countersuit for abuse of process, malicious 
prosecution, or forcible entry;  
• The requirement that the landlord institute unlawful detainer proceedings within ten days 
from receipt of notice is onerous and unreasonable; and 
• The requirement that the owner prevail in the unlawful detainer action, successfully evicting 
all residents of the premises or risking imposition of heavy fines, is inherently violative of 
due process.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: If Buena Park’s ordinance is flawed only for the three defects 
enumerated in the opinion, the city can probably fix them, enabling the law to survive future 
attacks.  
First, the initial notice to the landlord could be made far more detailed and include all the 
items of information the court finds currently missing.  
Second, the landlord could be given 30 rather than 10 days to begin eviction proceedings.  
Finally, the demand that the landlord succeed could be replaced by a requirement that it 
make a good faith effort in that direction.  
Given its energetic defense of the current ordinance, I do not doubt that the city will soon 
amend the law in order to remedy these perceived infirmities, if it has not already done so. 
But, like the concurring judge, I hesitate to say that these three problems cover the entire 
array of difficulties this ordinance presents.  
The concurring opinion adds concerns about the requir ment that all occupants of a unit 
be evicted even though only one occupant may be misbehaving. Assuming that such a “zero 
tolerance” policy can pass constitutional muster (se HUD v Rucker (2002) 535 US 125, 
152 L Ed 2d 258, 122 S Ct 1230, reported in 25 CEB RPLR 112 (Apr. 2002), I wonder 
whether a local community can require any single landlord to evict any of her individual 
tenants because of criminal misbehavior. Under the s atutory pilot programs described in 
the opinion, some cities apparently can evict tenants o  their own—and perhaps that can be 
justified under their delegated police powers. But how does that survive a Contract Clause 
challenge by a landlord unwilling to lose a rent-paying tenant who may not be disturbing 
anyone else in the building? And how, given those dangers, can a law-abiding landlady be 
compelled to evict a tenant against her will? How did CCP §1161(4), which authorizes 
bringing unlawful detainer against a tenant “using the premises for an unlawful purpose,” 
get to be a governmental mandate to do so? If the ci y itself either throws out a tenant or 
makes the landlady do so, does she have an inverse condemnation claim for lost rent if she 
can’t get a replacement? 
Of course, this law doesn’t come close to answering my perennial question: How do 
evictions eliminate the underlying problems that trigger them? As I have elsewhere noted 
about vicious dogs and their dangerous fellow tenants, I do not see how putting 
misbehaving tenants—perhaps with their knives and drug paraphernalia—out of their 
apartments and onto the street reduces the risk of harm to third parties.— Roger Bernhardt  
 
